Steve
Tue Jun 08 23:55:49 CDT 2004
The point of S/MIME is to eliminate two kinds of attacks:
* Eavesdropping -- by encrypting mail using the receiver's public key
* Modification -- by encrypting a hash of the message using the sender's
private key; thus in effect digitally signing the message
To achieve what you want would require that the advisor have access to keys
they shouldn't have. Think about it: one of your users sends an encrypted
mail. That mail is encrypted with the receiver's public key. The only key
that can decrypt it is the receiver's private key -- and only that person
should possess it! For the advisor to read the message, s/he would need the
receiver's private key. And if the receiver is someone outside your
organization, there's no way that person would allow such a thing.
Essentially, you're asking to break the principles of PKI.
Encrypting and signing mail are tools to guarantee confidentiality and
integrity. By purposefully inserting a man in the middle -- which is what
you're wanting to do -- you can no longer guarantee these security
attributes.
--
Steve
steriley@microsoft.com
"omer maydan" <anonymous@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message
news:E60FA3CA-9CEA-4838-A205-59BF4E6EB39A@microsoft.com...
> hi to you all... my situation is like this.
> i'm going to implement a fully operational S/mime + PKI infrastructure.
> i'm going to use the digital signature, as well the encrypted mail option.
> the thing is, that i need for legal avidance, to reroute all the mail in
> the organization, to a public folder, that a legal advisor could read all
> the mail running threw the organization. how could he do this, if he
> dosent have the private keys of all the users?(if solved can cause a
> non-repudation problem?...). the recovery agent option has very little
> documentation, and the solution is very complex to implement for such a
> reason... any suggestion?
>